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Abstention: The Supreme Court and
Allocation of Judicial Power
Randall P. Bezanson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an era of continually expanding federal judicial power, the
Supreme Court has fashioned and employed several devices designed to delegate certain classes of federal question litigation to the
state court systems. Among these devices are the doctrines of abstention, comity, and exhaustion of state remedies. Implementation
of these doctrines has enabled the Supreme Court to maintain state
judicial presence in federal question litigation and retain at least the
appearance of a manageable federalized judicial structure.
This article will attempt to analyze the function of the abstention doctrines as judicially-created tempering devices. Following a
brief discussion of the factors that led to the evolution of an abstention doctrine, the four main abstention theories, as currently applied, will be identified, and their underlying purposes and functions will be assessed. Lastly, these doctrines will be re-evaluated
with a view toward formulating a framework for applying abstention
that will better serve the ends the doctrine was designed to achieve.

II.

BACKGROUND

Article III of the United States Constitution vests the "judicial
Power of the United States.

.

. in one supreme Court, and in such

inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."' The Supreme Court very early assumed the power to
interpret the meaning of the Constitution and bind the other federal
branches and the states to its construction. 2 Indeed, the history of
the Supreme Court decision-making consists largely of repeated efforts to define the substantive meaning of Article III and related
clauses of the Constitution 3 and to establish the scope of subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.'
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. B.S., B.A., 1968, Northwestern University; J.D., 1971, University of Iowa.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958).
3. U.S. CONST. art. El, § 2, cl. 1,2; art. VI, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
4. E.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Armed with the broad Article III mandate and its own selfdeclared power to construe it, the Court has played a key role in
expanding both the extent of federal judicial power and the subject
matter jurisdiction in which this power may be exercised. Specifically, although the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
litigation concerning issues arising under the Constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States,5 the Supreme Court has established through a consistent line of opinions that the federal courts
are the preferred forum for vindication of federal rights and adjudication of federal issues.' Thus, with the expansion of federal judicial
power has come the expansion of federal court jurisdiction.
Congress also has been an important, though at times unintending, participant in this process of expanding jurisdiction and
judicial power. With the Judiciary Act of 17897 Congress established
the basic framework of the present judicial system, granting federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over certain issues8 and concurrent jurisdiction over others, including certain types of diversity cases.,
The jurisdiction of the federal courts was expanded somewhat during the period from 1789 to 1866,10 but it was not until the Civil War
5. U.S.

CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
6. E.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Ex ParteYoung,
209 U.S. 123 (1908); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225
(1972); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
Younger v. Harris is viewed as expansive of federal jurisdiction, and it is so from an
historical perspective. Prior to Younger federal courts were generally considered to be barred
from granting injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions. The stringent restrictions
on available injunctive relief in Dombrowski and Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943), applied to threatened prosecutions. Younger, coupled with Mitchum, broadened the
federal court's jurisdiction by recognizing circumstances in which injunctive relief against
pending prosecutions would be permitted. And Steffel v. Thompson broadened the availability of federal relief where state prosecution is threatened.
7. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, passim.
8. For example, the Act granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty cases.
Id. § 9, 1 Stat. 76.
9. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. 78, 79. No general federal question jurisdiction was conferred, and
federal courts were denied the power to issue writs of habeas corpus with respect to state
prisoners. Id. § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
10. The Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 92 granted federal courts judicial
powers as broad as those stated in article Ed, but this Act was repealed soon thereafter when
President Jefferson took office, Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
Removal to federal courts of litigation concerning federal revenue and customs laws was
permitted by the Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 94 § 6, 3 Stat. 233; Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, §
8, 3 Stat. 198; and the Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 633.
Federal courts were given the power to grant habeas corpus relief to prisoners in state
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Reconstruction era that Congress again significantly expanded the
scope of federal court jurisdiction by passing the Civil Rights Removal Statute," the Voting Rights Act of 1871,12 the Act of July 27,
1868,'1 and most importantly the Judiciary Act of 1875,1 which
granted federal courts concurrent jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction with respect to causes arising under the Constitution or laws
of the United States. Coupled with this augmented jurisdiction were
the various civil rights acts that conferred broad substantive rights
on all persons in the United States and left the judicial branch
substantial responsibilities for enforcement.'5 Since 1875 Congress
has altered and generally added to the federal courts' jurisdiction
in narrow, albeit significant, respects.'"
custody who were being held for crimes under federal law. Force Bill of 1833, Act of March
2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634. And in 1867, federal courts were given the power to grant
habeas corpus relief to state prisoners being held for violations of state law. Act of February
5, 1867, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
11. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
12. Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 99, §§ 15, 16, 16 Stat. 438-39. This provision was
repealed in 1894. Act of February 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36.
13. This act permitted the removal to federal court of cases brought against certain
federally-organized corporations where defenses were based upon the Constitution, treaties,
and laws of the United States. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 255, § 2, 15 Stat. 227.
14. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1, 2, 18 Stat. 470.
15. E.g., Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,
(1970)); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (now 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970)); The Ku Klux
Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970)); Civil
Rights Act of 1875, ch. 99, 18 Stat. 335, sections 1 and 2 of which were declared unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
These substantive powers were further expanded by Congress under the Civil Rights Acts
of 1957, 1960, and 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974, 2000(a)-(h), 3601-31; 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1971). The Supreme Court,
under these provisions and the enforcement provisions of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, as well as the Commerce Clause, has broadened the scope of federal powers vested in
Congress, and has thereby broadened the subjects over which the judicial power exists. See,
e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968); Cox, Foreward: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotionof Human
Rights, 80 HAnv. L. Rv.91 (1966).
16. For a detailed presentation of legislation after 1875, see Hufstedler, Comity and the
Constitution: The ChangingRole of the FederalJudiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rv.841, 844-45 &
nn.19-22 (1972).
Perhaps of more significance than jurisdictional expansion since 1875 has been Congress'
substantial legislation regarding civil rights, see note 15 supra, and, most recently, the environment. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970);
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857d(g), 1857h-2 (1970). These and other
federal statutes have greatly expanded the substantive domain of federal jurisdiction, and
have contributed appreciably to increased caseloads in the federal system. For example, civil
rights actions in federal courts numbered 296 in 1960. 1961 Annual Report of the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table C2, at 238 [hereinafter cited
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This brief survey suggests that the history of the Supreme
Court from its inception has been dominated by one common feature-a relatively consistent evolutionary process of expanding federal judicial power accompanied by expanding jurisdiction for federal courts. This pattern, however, has not been perfectly consistent. Congress has frequently attempted to curtail federal judicial
power and has often succeeded.' 7 The Supreme Court has also attempted to temper the pace of expanding federal judicial power by
delegating certain classes of federal question litigation to state court
systems' 8 through such doctrines as comity'" and exhaustion of state
as A.O. Report]. In 1970, the number of such cases had increased to 3,985, 1970 A.O. Report,
Table C2, at 232, and in 1972, to 6,133, 1972 A.O. Report, Table C2. A thorough analysis of
the increasing workload of federal courts during the past twelve years may be found in H.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 15-55 (1972).
17. E.g., Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132 (repealing Act of Feb. 13, 1801,
ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89); Ex ParteMcCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869)(congressional restriction
of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction). Following the Supreme Court's decision in Ex
ParteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), Congress enacted measures designed to temper or eliminate
the use of federal court injunctions against state officials. E.g., Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309,
§ 17, 36 Stat. 557, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)(three-judge federal district courts);
Anti-Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970). For an interesting discussion of more
recent, and largely unsuccessful, congressional attempts to curtail the Court's jurisdiction,
see W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONsTrrurION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, THE NEW LEGALITY
1932-1968, at 215-58 (1970).
One of Congress' earliest and certainly its most lasting effort at limiting federal judicial
power was the Anti-Injunction Act passed in 1793. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
18. One example of this is the Court's very narrow construction of the Civil Rights
Removal Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970), in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) and City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). The Court held in those cases that removal under
28 U.S.C. § 1443 would be justified only when a state statute clear on its face expressly
required the denial of a specifically guaranteed federal right to racial equality and the denial
of that right through enforcement of the state statute would inevitably result in denial of a
fair trial, as in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), or when a state statute, not
facially invalid, has been expressly preempted by a federal act that on its face immunizes
from prosecution the conduct that is the subject of the prosecution. The effect of these
decisions was to prevent an outright abandonment of state forums for the litigation of civil
rights cases arguably falling within the federal statute.
It is interesting to note that the standards imposed for civil rights removal are remarkably similar to those announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger imposed
restrictions on a federal court's ability to enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions.
19. This doctrine is best exemplified by Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);
and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). While this doctrine is to be distinguished from
the abstention doctrine and is beyond the scope of this article, there are significant parallels
between the comity doctrine and the third variety of abstention identified in this article. See,
e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). The difference, in part, lies in the fact that
the preference for the state forum in Younger is based almost exclusively on notions of
noninterference with historically rooted state judicial function. Under Burford, on the other
hand, federal dismissal in favor of the state forum is based not only on notions of noninterference with the state judicial system, but on greater reliability attached to the state court's
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remedies. 2 Abstention is yet another doctrine that the Court has
employed to reduce the power and jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The abstention doctrine, however, is not a monolith but is instead
a concept grounded on four distinct bases, each of which finds its
formulation in a Supreme Court decision.
III. THE ABSTENTION DoCTRINEs
A. Dispositive State Grounds-RailroadCommission v. Pullman
Company
While abstention was not unknown in the federal system prior
to 1941,21' Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Railroad Commission
v. Pullman Company 2 is generally considered to be the first full
articulation of the abstention doctrine. In Pullman the company
and its black porters charged that an order of the Texas Railroad
Commission was violative of the fourteenth amendment and in excess of the authority delegated to the Commission by the state legislature. The order required that all sleeper cars have in charge a
pullman conductor, all of whom were white, rather than a porter,
most of whom were black. The Court reversed the district court's
decision of federal issues. And under Burford abstention is complete; there is no later federal
adjudication at the district court level. Under Younger, however, re-entry to the federal
district court is available through habeas corpus.
The recent case of Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), substantially limits the
scope and application of the comity principle by permitting a federal court to grant declaratory relief when a prosecution is threatened, without any showing of irreparable injury. The
result of Steffel may be a race to the courthouse between the prospective criminal defendant
and the state prosecutor. If the defendant wins, declaratory relief will be available, although
it is by no means clear whether the federal declaratory judgment action will have any impact
on the state criminal action, which might proceed contemporaneously. Any injunctive relief
by the federal court, or any res judicata effect given to the federal judgment, may have to be
tested in light of Younger, for at that stage a state proceeding will be pending.
20. Exhaustion requirements were imposed on habeas corpus petitioners in state custody. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229 (1908) (Holmes, J.); Ex Parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). These requirements were
enacted in legislative form by Congress in 1948. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
During the 1972 Term, the Supreme Court once again established a judicially created
exhaustion requirement with respect to actions brought by state prisoners under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)(in which a prisoner sought immediate or
accelerated release from confinement).
21. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935); Spielman Motor Sales Co.
v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (relating to a state's interest in enforcement of criminal laws);
Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929) (relating to state regulatory
schemes); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
22. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAS
L. REv. 815 (1959); Note, Federal-QuestionAbstention: JusticeFrankfurter'sDoctrine in an
Activist Era, 80 HAnv. L. Rxv. 604 (1967).
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judgment enjoining enforcement of the Commission order and held
that the district court should have abstained from deciding the case
until the Texas courts had had an opportunity to determine the
legality of the challenged order on state law grounds. The Court
noted that the race discrimination issue touched upon a tender area
of social policy "which the federal courts ought not to enter unless
no alternative to its adjudication is open. ' 23 Also pointing to state
determination of the case was the Court's belief that the state law
issue relating to the legality of the order was "far from clear" 4 and
that it was "doubtful" 2 5 that the Commission had been empowered
by state law to issue the challenged order. The district court's position, therefore, was that of "a federal court of equity. . . asked to
decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication. 21 6 Frankfurter reasoned
that few public consequences are more significant to the exercise of
equitable discretion than "the avoidance of needless friction with
state policies" 27 that stems from" 'scrupulous regard for the rightful
independence of the state governments .
"...
128 In addition, a state
forum was easily available for determination of the state law issues
through appeal from the Commission's order or defense to an enforcement action. On the basis of these considerations the Court
ordered that the case be remanded to the district court with directions to retain jurisdiction pending a determination of proceedings
in the state courts.
The form of abstention exercised in Pullman,then, occurs when
the resolution of issues of state law may be dispositive of the federal
question presented.2 9 Most Pullman-type abstention cases have involved federal constitutional claims, but there is little reason to
limit abstention to this context; a state law issue that might dispose
of a question arising under federal statute could also require abstention.3" Pullman abstention occurs only when the underlying state
23. 312 U.S. at 498.
24. Id. at 499.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 500.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 501, quoting Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935).
29. E.g., Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
30. See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972). Nor, in light of Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), in which abstention was
ordered in a diversity case presenting only state law issues, would there by any basis for
limiting abstention to cases in which federal jurisdiction was granted concurrently with state
courts.
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law issues are unclear, because of inconsistent state court pronouncements, unaddressed state law questions, 31 or new and uninterpreted state statutes that may be subject to varying interpretations material to the federal question.32 In such instances the federal
court will stay its hand and allow the state court to adjudicate the
relevant state law issues. 3 Abstention under Pullman,of course, will
be ordered only if means of obtaining state court adjudication are

available .3
Certain functional benefits of such an approach are obvious
from the federal court's perspective. First, abstention in this context
delays the decision of the federal question presented-often a constitutional question." Also, if either the state law issue or the federal
31. An example might be, as in Pullman, state law restrictions on the delegation of
legislative power to an administrative agency. Such restrictions might stem from state common law or state constitutional provisions, as well as other state statutory provisions. See
Department of Social Services v. Dimery, 398 U.S. 322 (1970), vacating mem. 320 F. Supp.
1125 (S.D. Iowa 1969).
32. When a statute is new or totally without judicial construction, abstention has been
ordered, as long as the construction of the statute is not clear and could obviate the need to
determine the federal question. See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498
(1972); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); cf. City
of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948). In some cases, however, construction of the state statute will not suffice if the applicability of the statute is clear, but the challenge is based on the inherent vagueness of the
statutory requirement. E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); see text accompanying
notes 161-65 infra.
33. E.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Fornaris v. Ridge
Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970); Department of Social Services v. Dimery, 398 U.S. 322 (1970);
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); United Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959);
Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Shipman v. DuPre,
339 U.S. 321 (1950); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v.
McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944);
Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
34. If no adequate state court remedy exists, abstention will not be ordered and the
federal court will decide the state law issues. E.g., Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell,
326 U.S. 620 (1946).
35. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965), presents an interesting variant of the application of the Pullman abstention doctrine with respect to the granting of relief rather than
adjudication of the underlying issues. After remand from the United States Supreme Court
in Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S. 560 (1964), the federal district court had declared the Illinois
constitutional and statutory legislative apportionment provisions unconstitutional. Germano
v. Kerner, 241 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Ill. 1965). Shortly thereafter in People ex rel. Engle v.
Kerner, 32 Il. 2d 212, 205 N.E.2d 33 (1965), a separate proceeding in the state courts, the
Illinois Supreme Court had likewise held the Illinois Senate apportionment invalid, and like
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issue is resolved in favor of the federal plaintiff, the federal court
avoids deciding the federal question altogether,3 a result consistent
with the frequently announced policy that a federal court should not
decide a constitutional issue unless no alternative to its resolution
exists. 37 Pullman abstention also shifts the responsibility for deciding state law issues to the state courts, 38 thereby serving the purposes underlying the principle of dual judicial sovereignty.
Other functional benefits of this form of abstention are perhaps
less apparent. The most significant benefit is that an abstention
permitting state court determination of possibly dispositive state
law issues may not only avoid the federal court's need to decide the
federal question, but may avoid the need to resolve the federal issues in any forum.3 9 Pullman abstention may also serve as a convenient and effective technique for controlling and limiting the exercise
of jurisdiction, particularly with respect to the Supreme Court's
appellate docket." The avoidance of decision that results, moreover,
the federal court, had ordered that a new apportionment plan be enacted. Both courts retained jurisdiction to review the new plan or take any necessary action in the absence of an
adequate new plan.
The federal district court was then asked to vacate its order holding the Illinois plan
invalid and to stay further action in view of the state court decision. The district court
refused, but the Supreme Court reversed and ordered the district court to establish a timetable for implementation of a new plan. In the absence of submission of an acceptable plan to
the state court by the designated date, the federal court could re-enter the case and order
necessary relief.
A number of observations may be noted. First, the Supreme Court did not vacate the
federal court's judgment holding the state scheme unconstitutional; nor did it intimate that,
prior to its judgment, the federal court should have abstained. Abstention was ordered only
with respect to relief - to permit the state court to enforce its parallel judgment. Thus, the
abstention that was ordered was extemely limited and was greatly affected by the pendency
of the state court proceedings. Avoidance of duplicative judicial effort, as well as the harsh
irritant of a federal court overseeing state legislative reapportionment, seems to be at the
heart of the abstention decision.
36. See, e.g.. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,
296 U.S. 207 (1935); Klinger v. State of Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1872); Hill,
The InadequateState Ground, 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 943 (1965).
37. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498, 500 (1941). See, e.g., Martin
v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 224 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177-78 (1959); Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331
(1955).
38. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474-75 n.21 (1974). Political capability may
be a significant factor as well. Avoidance of politically explosive consequences may have
affected the decision in Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965), discussed in note 35 supra.
39. E.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 498 (1941). This result does not always ensue. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
427-28 (1963); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
40. E.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Askew v. Hargrave,
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makes the doctrine a useful political tempering device.' And in a
closely related sense abstention is, in part, a face-saving device for
the federal court. It avoids the problem encountered in Swift v.
401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S.
167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The abstention cases that
have not arisen in this context have tended to be diversity cases. E.g., Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943). Without necessarily impugning the principled foundation of the abstention doctrine,
the doctrine has also served as an effective device for controlling the Supreme Court's workload.
41. Its early development may in large part be attributed to the Court's decision in Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Young the Supreme Court permitted state officials to
be sued in their individual capacity for violations of federal constitutional duties occurring
in the course of employment, notwithstanding the officials' compliance with applicable state
law. Young also sanctioned the device of federal injunctions against the prosecution of threatened criminal proceedings.
Reaction to the Young decision was widespread and negative in some quarters, and the
device of abstention may well have served to temper that reaction by permitting state court
participation in litigation that resulted from Young.
See H. HART & H. WacHsLER, THE FEDERAL CounTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 965-79 (2d
ed. 1973) for a discussion of the statutory limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts to
entertain actions against state officials after the Young decision.
That the doctrine was applied both to temper the reaction following Young and as a
defense to further reaction by Congress is illustrated in the following quotation from Pullman,
312 U.S. at 501:
These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby
the federal courts, "exercising a wise discretion," restrain their authority because of
"scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments" and for the
smooth working of the federal judiciary . . . . [Cases omitted.] This use of equitable
powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state
and federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of those
powers. Compare 37 Stat. 1013 [28 U.S.C. § 380 (1940)]; Judicial Code, § 24(1), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1); 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15.
The three statutes cited in the passage require a three-judge court when an injunction against
enforcement of a state statute is sought (28 U.S.C. § 380 (1940), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §
2281 (1970)), prohibit federal courts from enjoining both assessment or collection of state
taxes and rate orders issued by state administrative agencies (28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32, 1341-42, 1345, 1354, 1359 (1970)), and limit the power of
federal courts to order injunctive relief in a case growing out of or involving a labor dispute
covered under 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970). The Court quite obviously
had Congress's reactions to Young firmly in mind when Pullman was decided.
A sampling of cases in which abstention under Pullmanhas been ordered seems to bear
this out. Pullman abstention has not been limited to cases concerning only economic or
business interest. Rather, it has been applied with increasing consistency in the context of
individual rights. E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (first and fourteenth amendment challenge to Virginia barratry statute which precluded the NAACP from providing legal
advice and counsel in civil rights cases); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm.
v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (first and fourteenth amendment challenge to Alabama
statute regulating labor union activities of public employees); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S.
242 (1953) (vagueness and first amendment challenge to Michigan Communist Control Act);
AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) (first and fourteenth amendment challenge to state right
to work law); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945) (first and
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Tyson'" of conflicting federal and state court pronouncements on
questions of purely local law.4"
Since abstention in general is basically an allocative device
designed to promote the sharing of responsibility in federal litigation with state courts, it takes advantage of the expertise of state
courts on state law issues. State courts may be more capable of
articulating and understanding the purposes underlying a state
statute or regulatory order, and they may be better able to identify
and narrow the relevant issues and accumulate the factual record
necessary to a full and fair determination of the litigation.4 3 In the
Pullman abstention context, this expertise may be manifested in at
least two concrete ways. First, as the state court is not prohibited
from considering the state law issue in light of the federal issue," a
more sensitive resolution of the federal question may ultimately
result from abstention,45 whether the state or federal court ultimately passes on the federal question. Secondly and most importantly, the state court has the authority to make a permanent and
binding construction of state law in a manner that could avoid the
federal issue, while the federal court's power in this respect is severely limited.4 6 Thus, Pullman abstention facilitates authoritative
fourteenth amendment challenge to state regulation of labor organizations); cf. Askew v.
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (equal protection challenge to Florida system of funding primary and secondary education); Department of Social Services v. Dimery, 398 U.S. 322
(1970), vacating mem. 320 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. Iowa 1969) (equal protection challenge to Iowa
welfare eligibility provision); Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965) (challenge to Illinois
Senate apportionment).
41.1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
42. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). See, e.g., Gelpcke v.
City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864).
43. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959);
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 229 (1957); cf. United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973). See Kurland, Toward a Co-operativeJudicial
Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 487 (1960).
44. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 42122 (1964); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364
(1957).
45. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
46. See Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 470-71 (1945). While
the federal court, faced with an issue of state law that had not been spoken to by the state
supreme court, might have the power to construe the state statute in a way that would avoid
the federal question, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-91 & n.24 (1949); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941), such a construction would bind only the
parties to the lawsuit. It would not bind state courts or other individuals; and when the state
statute is clear, although uninterpreted, some cases suggest that the federal court would have
no power to place a saving construction or gloss on the statute. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1971). A state court, however, is capable of placing a binding and
permanent gloss on the state statute that might avoid the consitutional issues, clarify the
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constructions of state statutes or regulations while permitting retention of the basic regulatory or statutory scheme and avoiding the
possibility of a federal court misconstruction.47 Pullman abstention
is accordingly much more than a device that promotes a functionally rational allocation of judicial resources;" it also serves to protect the integrity of state government and the effectiveness of its
regulatory systems.
While some types of abstention can be justified on the ground
that they increase the responsiblity of state courts in adjudicating
federal questions and thus promote greater respect for the state
judiciary,49 it is questionable whether Pullman abstention contributes appreciably to the realization of these objectives. Although
abstention posited on potentially dispositive state law grounds results in state court participation in federal question litigation, such
participation is severely limited, with respect to the federal issues,
by the prospect of subsequent federal court re-examination of those
issues. Under England v. Medical Examiners" the state court is
given substantial responsibility only with respect to the state law
issues underlying the federal cause of action. While the state court
may also adjudicate the federal issues if it pleases, the full federal
system stands ready to review the state judgment on these matters
51
if a mistake is made.
reach of the statute, and leave the state statute or regulatory system intact. See Lee v.
Bickell, 292 U.S. 415, 425 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 179 (1933); Siler
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Note, FederalInterpretationof State Legislation,
37 HAnv. L. REv. 1129 (1924). See note 48 infra.
47. See A.F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 598, 599 (1946); City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest
Dairies, 316 U.S. 168, 171-73 (1942); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499501 (1941). But see Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-89 (1949).
48. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474 n.21 (1974), the Court made the following
observation:
Abstention, a question "entirely separate from the question of granting declaratory
or injunctive relief," Lake Carriers'Ass'n.v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 n.13 (1972),
might be more appropriate when a challenge is made to the state statute as applied,
rather than upon its face, since the reach of an uncertain state statute might, in that
circumstance, be more susceptible to a limiting or clarifying construction that would
avoid the federal constitutional question. Cf. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S., at 249-252,
254; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-378 (1964).
49. Eg., Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) (abstention to permit state court determination on the basis of state constitutional provisions similar to the federal constitutional
provisions); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943) (dismissal of federal jurisdiction
to permit the state court to determine state law issues that are identical to the federal issues).
50. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
51. Id. at 421-22. Under England the federal plaintiff is entitled to preserve his right to
return to the federal district court after resolution of the state law issues in the state forum.
Id. Appeal or certiorari from the state supreme court to the United States Supreme Court is
not a prerequisite to return to the federal district court, nor will such appeal bar return to
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B. Modification of the Federal Question-Lake CarriersAssociation v. MacMullan
A closely related, yet distinct variety of abstention occurs when
state law grounds underlying the federal claim will most likely not
be dispositive but will modify or assist in the decision of the federal
question. 2 In these circumstances the federal court will abstain in
order to permit a preliminary state adjudication but will retain
jurisdiction in order to decide later the federal issue in light of the
state court's judgment. The result may be a more precise definition
of the the federal issue, in light of state law and policy,53 or a more
complete and reliable factual basis for deciding the federal issue. 4
These additional insights provided by the state forum may affect
either the federal court's view of the merits of the federal claim or
the scope of the federal court's opinion and judgment once the merits are reached.- The ripeness doctrine is an appropriate analogy.
the federal district court. Id. at 416-17. Moreover, after making the required reservation the
litigant may present the federal issues to the state court insofar as they bear on the resolution
of the state law issue. Id. at 419-20.
Not only does the explicit reservation presented to the state court heighten the tension
between the 2 judicial systems, it also frequently results in grossly inefficient use of judicial
resources, for both the state and federal systems may have to decide the federal issues. See
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm.
v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957). The consequences of Pullman abstention in terms of
delay have been thoroughly documented. E.g., Note, Federal-QuestionAbstention: Justice
Frankfurter'sDoctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HAv. L. Rav. 604 (1967); Kurland, Toward a
Co-operative Judicial Federalism; the Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481
(1960); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs L. Rav. 813 (1959). Such
delay and the additional costs associated with it constitute a serious misallocation ofjudicial
resources when viewed from the perspective of the combined judicial systems. While the delay
and inefficiency may be justifiable in some contexts in light of local prejudice-for example,
when first amendment rights are at stake-an indiscriminate application of the England rule
to all abstention cases presents serious problems regarding efficient and effective use of
judicial resources.
52. See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.Sm 16u (1959).
53. See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972). See note 19
supra.
54. See, e.g., England v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). Compare
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), with Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). In this respect abstention is functionally similar to required exhaustion of administrative remedies.
55. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972), serves as an example. Lake
Carrierspresented a question of federal preemption and the consequent validity of the Michigan Watercraft Pollution Control Act of 1970, MscH. CoM. LAws ANN. § 323.331 et seq.
(Supp. 1972). Not only was an understanding of the statutory terms necessary to a decision
of the federal issue, but the Court also needed an understanding of the "legislative facts"
giving rise to the Act and affecting its application in order to assess and balance the state's
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While the case brought before the federal court would be ripe in the
constitutional sense, the federal court might not be prepared to
reach the merits, either because it lacks an appreciation and
standing of relevant state policy56 or because it lacks a full understanding of the meaning or application of a challenged statute or
rule.5 1 Proceeding to judgment in this context poses the danger that
the federal judgment might be too broad or too narrow and that it
might be based on insufficient sensitivity to legitimate state concerns.
The most recent example of this variant of abstention is Lake
5 8 Lake Carriers' involved
Carriers'Ass'n v. MacMullan.
a supremacy clause issue that had to be resolved in light of a careful and
complete understanding of the allegedly preempted state statute
and the policies underlying it.55 The question presented was the
extent to which the Michigan Watercraft Pollution Control Act of
197060 was preempted by the Steamboat Inspection Acts of 1871.1
The Michigan statute was detailed, and the effect of its provisions
not absolutely clear. While return to the federal court after abstention may have been inevitable, the state court's judgment concerning the effect and meaning of the state statute would be of substantial benefit to a later federal judgment on the extent of preemption.
Preemption is not the only situation in which this form of abstention would be appropriate. Despite the inevitability of federal
re-entry into the litigation under England, abstention to permit
articulation of state policy or development of a factual basis for an
informed decision, particularly in matters "intimately involved
with the sovereign prerogative," 62 may not only result in a better
informed later federal judgment but also in the elimination of cerinterest in its regulatory scheme. Indeed, the dissenting justices felt that the statute was
facially clear. 406 U.S., at 513-16. This fact, if true, strongly suggests that the motivation that
gave rise to abstention was a need for a more thorough understanding of the effect of the state
regulations and the policies underlying them.
56. E.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
57. E.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
58. 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
59. See Note, Pre-emptionas a PreferentialGround:A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. Rzv. 208 (1959).
60. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 323.331 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
61. Acts of Feb. 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 440, and of May 27, 1936, 49 Stat. 1380, as amended,
46 U.S.C. §§ 361 et seq. Pre-emption was also alleged to result from the United StatesCanadian Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 36 Stat. 2448. 406 U.S. at 503 n.1.
62. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959). The
policies underlying this form of abstention are substantially the same as those underlying
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). The difference may lie in the fact that under
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tain issues from the controversy. This form of abstention may consequently lighten the federal court's workload by reducing the scope
of the adjudication required in that forum.
The drawback of this variety of abstention, however, should be
noted. First, the state court is relegated to determination of state
law issues without the satisfaction of finally disposing of the controversy. While the benefits to the state government of more reliable
federal adjudication may offset this cost, one must be sensitive to
the perceptions and attitudes of state court judges. The possible
difficulties, moreover, may go deeper than mere pique. The state
court may consider itself without jurisdiction in this context, as the
state court judgment may be little more than an advisory opinion."3
Secondly, when federal re-entry is inevitable, abstention and delay
go hand-in-hand. Under Pullman the possible state court disposition of the case on state or federal grounds may result in more
expeditious adjudication than that available in the federal court;
under the instant variety of abstention this result is highly unlikely.
These costs must ultimately be weighed against the benefits of a
more responsible and sensitive adjudication of the federal issue because of the federal court's utilization of the state judgment.
C.

Interference with State Function-Burford v. Sun Oil
Company

A third variety of abstention occurs when a federal court is
faced with a federal issue 4 that goes to the heart of important state
Burford the state forum is considered more reliable for adjudication of all issues presented-both state and federal. Here, however, the state court is not considered a fully
reliable forum for adjudication of federal questions. See text accompanying notes 90-91 infra.
Accordingly, dismissal of the action is not permitted.
63. See United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
64. The federal issue, as used here, includes both issues arising under the constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States, and issues of state law arising in the context of a federal
diversity action. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1966). See, e.g., Martin v.
Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). In a diversity case raising only state law
issues concerning the validity of a state statute regulating water rights under the New Mexico
constitution, the Supreme Court ordered the federal court to refrain from deciding the case
because the state law issue underlying the case was "one of vital concern in the arid State of
New Mexico, where water is one of the most valuable natural resources. The issue moreover,
[was] a truly novel one" that would eventually have to be resolved by the New Mexico
courts. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 594 (1968). It is noteworthy that
a state court proceeding for declaratory judgment concerning the same underlying issue was
pending. The federal court retained jurisdiction, but for the limited purpose of insuring
prompt adjudication in the state court rather than for full scale readjucication under
England. Id. at 594.
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governmental interests, and, in view of the importance of the conflict's resolution to state government as well as the difficulty of
resolving the issues in the federal forum, the federal court dismisses
the case to permit determination of the federal issue in the state
forum.
Burford v. Sun Oil Company6 5 is the principal case illustrating
this variety of abstention. Burford involved a challenge to an order
of the Texas Railroad Commission that granted Burford permission
to drill four wells on a small plot of land in Texas. This order would
have allowed Burford to draw more oil than the applicable spacing
requirements for wells permitted." The challenge was based on both
state and federal law: the commission was alleged to have unreasonably granted an exception to the state spacing rule and to have
denied Sun Oil Company its property right to a proportional share
of the oil in the field, in violation of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause." The action was maintained in federal court by virtue of diversity of citizenship, and the existence of federal jurisdiction over the controversy was unchallenged." Notwithstanding the
federal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the district court and ordered the case dismissed." Sun Oil Company was relegated to relief in state court on the federal due process
question as well as the state law issue. Return to the federal district
court after resolution of the state law issues was not permitted;
rather, appeal or certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was
the only means of federal court review that the Supreme Court
70
would countenance.
Three essential factors distinguish this form of abstention from
the two varieties discussed earlier. First, under Burford a federal
issue forms the basis for abstention; if state issues are present they
are ordinarily identical to the federal issues. 7' Under Pullman, on
65. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
66. Id. at 316-17. The challenged order permitted an exception to the general rule
embodied in Rule 37, which provided for certain minimum spacing between wells. Id. at 322.
67. Id. at 317.
68. Id. at 317-18.
69. Id. at 334.
70.c Id.
71. See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 (1948); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 182 (1935). Of course, if the action is maintained in federal court on federal question grounds alone, there will be no applicable state
law. Nonetheless, abstention under Burford may be ordered in appropriate circumstances for
state court resolution of the federal question. See Great Lake Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,
319 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1943).
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the other hand, it is the applicable state law issue which justifies
abstention, and the state issue is ordinarily distifict from the federal
claim. 72 Secondly, under Burford unclarity of state law is not a basis
for abstention; under Pullman unclarity of state law issues is the
sine qua non of abstention. 3 Finally, under Burford the federal district court is not permitted to re-enter the litigation after the state
court has spoken. 74 Under the England case, which applies in the
Pullman abstention context, federal re-entry at the district court
level is virtually guaranteed .75 These distinctions serve to highlight
the differing policies that give rise to abstention in the Burford
context.
One such policy involves recognition of the various state interests that might underlie a state regulatory system. The Burford
Court recognized that the Texas regulatory system for oil production represented the state's attempt to accomplish numerous objectives of overriding interest to the state, such as public financing and
economic stability. 76 The Burford Court reasoned that the state
court's greater understanding of those interests made it the more
appropriate forum for adjudication of the issues.
The sine qua non of abstention under Burford, then, is the
presence of issues relating to matters of overriding interest to state
government, but this broad conception is too general to be of utility
in predicting the doctrine's application. A sampling of numerous
applications of Burford abstention, however, provides insight into
the discrete components of this general standard. In Burford, abstention was ordered to avoid potential disruption of an historically
established, broad-ranging, state regulatory program. The regulatory system itself, moreover, was designed to assure economic stability within the state, preserve important natural resources, and
provide tax revenues for state government. In view of these factors,
72. See notes 29-33, 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
74. See cases cited in note 71 supra.
75. See notes 50-51 supraand accompanying text.
76. In Burford the Court traced in detail the evolution of the regulatory system for oil
production that was managed by the Texas Railroad Commission and that lay at the heart
of that case. Under the auspices of the regulatory program, the State was endeavoring to
accomplish numerous objectives involving the balancing of multiple and often competing
interests: conservation of gas and oil, an important natural resource of the State; regulation
of the impact of the oil industry on the economy of the State; cooperation with other oil
producing states; protection of tax revenues from oil production which were applied to state
educational and eleemonsynary institutions; response to market demand through regulation
of supply; and protection of private wells that were competing for oil from a common reservoir. 319 U.S. at 320-23.

19741

ABSTENTION

1123

federal intrusion threatened matters that rested at the very heart
of state government.77
Other cases in which Burford-style abstention has been invoked
suggest a number of characteristics of the overriding state governmental interests that will justify this abstention. First, abstention
will be ordered to protect the state's interest in regulating and preserving important natural resources. 78 Secondly, established state
regulatory systems, with a history of state judicial experience reviewing cases arising under that system, often provide a basis for
deference to the state forum under Burford.79 Thirdly, cases involving areas of traditional state power, such as eminent domain" or
public education,8 l are accorded deference under the abstention
doctrine. Finally, even in the absence of an established regulatory
system, abstention may be ordered in view of the very high possibility of an intrusive federal adjudication severely handicapping state
government and state power. 2
The presence of significant state governmental interest in the
outcome of the controversy, however, will not, standing alone, justify abstention under Burford. In virtually every Burford abstention
case the Supreme Court also has emphasized the reliability of the
state court adjudicatory process in the resolution of the issues presented. In Burford the majority considered the state courts to be far
more reliable than federal courts for adjudication of claims arising
from the state regulatory system. State courts were "close" to the
policies and facts underlying the system of regulation. 3 Specifically,
77. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943); accord, Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
78. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (New Mexico's interest
in a statutory system for regulating water rights).
79. See Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951).
80. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959) (state eminent domain power critical to the
completion of a comprehensive state highway system).
81. Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383-84 (1949).
82. E.g., Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965); cf. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219
(1959).
83. 319 U.S. at 325-26. The Burford Court also noted that many prior federal court
decisions involving the Texas regulatory system had seriously disrupted the State's ability
to protect its interest, and federal adjudication had resulted in few, if any, salutory effects.
Id. at 327-32. Because of the difficult legal as well as non-legal complexities involved in
assessing the reasonableness of the commission's action in particular cases, the federal courts
were seriously handicapped. "As a practical matter, the federal courts [could] make small
contribution" to the organized system of regulations, Id. at 327; and federal intervention
posed a real danger of a federal court misunderstanding state law and failing to appreciate
the policies and facts underlying regulatory orders and rules. Id. at 327-28.
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this reliability may have a number of sources: substantial experience adjudicating the issues raised in the litigation; s4 superior factfinding abilities;81 superior appreciation of and sensitivity to the
issues presented and the underlying state policies bearing on the
controversy; 6 or greater power to order relief 7 and expeditious resolution of the case.88 In view of the considerations of both state interests and reliability, the Burford Court concluded that the state
forum should more properly adjudicate controversies arising under
the Texas regulatory system, despite the presence of federal jurisdiction and despite the presence of purely federal issues as well as
state law issues cognizable under the federal court's diversity jurisdiction.8 9
The Court's opinion clearly manifests the basic policy underlying the present form of abstention. In certain selected areas, the
state court is considered to be a more reliable and efficient forum
for adjudication of federal issues than the federal court." Unlike
Pullman abstention, Burford abstention is not based on possible
avoidance of the federal question. The Burford doctrine relates to
where rather than when or whether the federal issue is to be determined. The state forum is not employed as a device for avoiding
federal adjudication by resolving distinct state law issues or for
"educating" a later federal judgment. Rather, it is employed to
84. E.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943).
85. E.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 349 (1951);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 182-89
(1935).
86. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Martin v.
Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383-84 (1949); Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); cf. Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
87. See Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 383-84 (1949); cf. Scott v.
Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
88. See Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 182 (1935) (in the absence of abstention,
federal court would duplicate efforts of state court, and could resolve only a portion of the
controversy immediately).
89. "These questions of regulation of the industry by the state administrative agency,
whether involving gas or oil prorationing programs or Rule 37 cases, so clearly involve basic
problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas
courts the first opportunity to consider them." 319 U.S. at 332.
90. See Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 (1948); Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943);
Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935); cf. Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933). In
each of these cases the federal action was dismissed.
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decide the federal issue itself.9 A federal district court does not wait
in the background in order to review the state court judgment. Instead, the state court is raised to a level of decision-making parity
with the federal court and only appellate review in the United
States Supreme Court is available to assure the integrity of the state
court's adjudication of the federal issue.
Finally, as noted earlier, most cases in which Burford abstention is applied raise difficult, frequently fact-specific, and timeconsuming problems.12 The legal issues raised by the cases may be
clear, but application of law to fact is almost always very difficult,93
politically explosive,94 or simply very time consuming. 5 The importance of the federal right asserted also seems to bear on the application of the Burford rule, for while some Burford cases involve important or fundamental federal guarantees, the more common application of the doctrine is found in cases involving the regulation of
business activity or the exercise of nonfundamental rights."
From the perspective of the federal system, Burford abstention
provides a broad range of benefits. The most important advantage
lies in the fact that original jurisdiction in the federal courts is
completely avoided. Moreover, in light of the difficulty of obtaining
Supreme Court review of state court decisions, significant amounts
of work may be lifted from the appellate docket of the federal system
as well.9 Many of the federal questions raised in the Burford con91. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494-95 (1942).
92. Cf. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Pennsylvania v.
Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935).
93. E.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
94. E.g., Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336
U.S. 368 (1949).
95. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935).
96. While Burford abstention appears typically to occur in business contexts, this is not
invariably true. See Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949) (challenge to
Hawaii statute limiting foreign language teaching in grade schools). Cf. Scott v. Germano,
381 U.S. 407 (1965) (state senate reapportionment). In the Pullman abstention context,
however, the importance of the rights asserted seems to have little relation to the abstention
decision. See note 41 supra.
97. During the 1971 Term the Supreme Court disposed of 82% of appeals properly filed
without oral argument, and dismissed or denied certiorari in 90.4% of the certiorari petitions
acted upon. FEDERAL
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A3, A10 (1972). In view of the difficulty of obtaining Supreme Court review
of the judgment of a state's highest court, it is unlikely that federal re-entry at the Supreme
Court level following Burford abstention will occur.
Many cases in which Burford abstention has been ordered would have required a 3-judge
federal district court and subsequent direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
SUPREME COURT
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text, furthermore, are difficult, and by this abstention device the
federal system avoids the need to decide hard questions."
A second advantage of Burford abstention is that friction between the state and federal systems, which may be exacerbated
rather than avoided under Pullman abstention,99 is substantially
eliminated. The state forum is given virtually final adjudicative
authority, and consequently the prospect of later federal review does
not serve as a divisive influence. Since there is no splitting of the
litigation, and no opportunity to obtain full relitigation at the federal district court level, the delay so characteristic of Pullman abstention is effectively avoided.
Finally, more reliable and fair adjudication of federal issues is
purportedly insured under the Burford rule. Although realization of
this objective must depend on the peculiar circumstances of the
controversy, at least in Burford, the consequence of better adjudication of the federal issues in the state court seems very likely to have
resulted. Thus, the Burford rule protects the interests not only of
the federal forum but also of the litigants who have selected the
federal forum, for the litigants are entitled not to a favorable decision regardless of the merits, but to the best and most expeditious
decision available on the merits.
Substantial benefits also flow to the state when the Burford rule
is applied. The quality and reputation of the state judiciary is enhanced, due in large part to the greater responsibility in the resulting adjudication of federal matters. The coercive threat of later
federal re-entry is avoided by dismissal in the federal court. The
possibility of conflicting interpretations of state law by the state and
federal courts is avoided, ' and interference by the federal courts
with important state governmental interests is virtually eliminated.
Further, the state court has a free hand in assessing both the facts
Abstention under Burford thus will result in avoidance of both time-consuming adjudication
in that court and obligatory appellate review in the Supreme Court. When the cases could
be heard by a single judge district court, Burford abstention will avoid not only district court
and Supreme Court litigation, but appellate review at the Circuit Court level as well.
98. E.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943). Of course, in each of these cases significant governmental interests were at stake, and
significant expertise regarding the issues rested in the state forum. For a discussion of the
meaning of these additional factors and their proper application see text accompanying notes
78-96 supra.Nevertheless, the "hardness" of the questions presented, despite clarity of underlying state law, is a significant element contributing to abstention under Burford.
99. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
100. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327-28, 334 (1943).

1974]

ABSTENTION

1127

and the policies underlying the state regulatory system in light of
federal requirements.10°
Burford abstention, properly applied, seems to benefit everyone
and prejudice the legitimate interests of no one. Thus, while, at first
blush, it might be viewed as the least defensible form of abstention,
particularly in view of the proposition that "a court having jurisdiction must exercise it," ' s upon further analysis it seems the least
impeachable of the various forms of abstention. It can result in the
most satisfactory adjudication, occasioning no delay, coercion, or
friction between the federal and state systems. It is a doctrine limited in scope and application that permits state court adjudication
of federal issues at the federal court's discretion. Burford abstention
requires sensitive discrimination between the types of federal issues
that the state and federal courts are best capable of resolving and
avoids the unseemly relegation to state courts of state issues alone.
It is thus consistent with and protective of the federal adjudicative
power that the state and federal systems jointly possess.
D. Identical State and FederalIssues-Reetz v. Bozanich
The final variety of abstention has been ordered when a state
constitution embodying federal constitutional standards may dispose of the case.' 3 Reetz v. Bozanich'" typifies this variety of abstention. Reetz involved a challenge on federal equal protection
grounds to an Alaska statute that limited the availability of commercial salmon-fishing licenses to certain persons who had fished in
Alaskan waters in the past. A three-judge federal district court declared the statute and regulations unconstitutional and enjoined
their enforcement.' 5 The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the
101. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474-75 n.21 (1974); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 327-28 (1943); notes
46-47 supra.
102. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19 (1939). See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
103. E.g., Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82
(1970). But see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
Two further varieties of abstention are identified by Professor Wright: abstention to
avoid decision of difficult questions of state law, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), and abstention to serve the convenience of the federal courts,
e.g., P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951). C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 203, 205 (2d ed. 1970). The former is subsumed in the
third variety of abstention discussed in this article. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying
text. The latter has not been recognized explicity by the Supreme Court, although a number
of cases could be viewed as incorporating, at least in part, such an approach. E.g., Askew v.
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
104. 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
105. Bozanich v. Reetz, 297 F. Supp. 300 (D. Alas. 1969).
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district court to abstain pending a determination of the issues by
the state court. While the Alaska statute was clear, and no mention
was made of a possible construction that might avoid or modify the
federal issue, the Court held that abstention was proper in order to
permit the Alaska courts to interpret theretofore uninterpreted provisions of the Alaska constitution.' 6 Some emphasis was placed on
the state's substantial interest in preserving its valuable natural
resources, 0 7 but the abstention was not justified by any need for
state court fact findings or elucidation of policy that would alter the
federal question or educate later federal review. Rather, abstention
was based on the need for the state court to determine an issue of
state law, the construction and meaning of the Alaska constitutional
provisions, a determination that could have the same result as
would follow from the application of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause.' 8 Inasmuch as state constitutional provisions may not be inconsistent with federal constitutional requirements,1°9 the effect of abstention was to force a "federalization" of
the relevant state constitution by the state court."'
This type of abstention is materially different from Burford
abstention, in which the federal court dismisses a case because the
state and federal issues are identical and sensitivity to local interest,
as well as fact-finding competence, may be found in the state forum.
106. "Wherever occuring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved
to the people for common use." ALAs. CONsr. art. VIII § 3. "No exclusive right or special
privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State .... Id.

§ 15.
107. 397 U.S. at 87.
108. Of course, this will not be the result in all cases in which state constitutional issues
might dispose of the federal issue; rather, this form of abstention is limited to circumstances
in which the state constitutional provision approximates the guarantee of the federal provision relied upon. For example, in Department of Social Services v. Dimery, 398 U.S. 322
(1970), the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a decision of a 3-judge district court that
concluded that a challenged provision of a state AFDC regulation was invalid as a matter of
state constitutional law because it constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers.
Dimery v. Department of Social Services, 320 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D. Iowa 1969). In Dimery the
ground for abstention was state consitutional doctrine, but the state constitutional question
was distinct from the federal constitutional question under the equal protection clause. The
fact that the delegation doctrine was of constitutional stature in Iowa does not serve to
meaningfully distinguish Dimery from Pullman, in which the underlying state law issue also
concerned the scope of legislative delegation of rulemaking power. In Reetz, however, the
effect and substance of the state constitutional guarantee was the same as the federal equal
protection clause, and the relevant issues under both the state and federal constitutions
would be nearly identical.
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
110. This coercive effect is even more evident inasmuch as the Supreme Court did not
order the federal district court to dismiss the case. 397 U.S. at 87.
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In Reetz the matter was of interest to the state, but there was no
indication of greater expertise or sensitivity to the relevant issues on
the part of the state court.
The decision in Reetz and that of Askew v. Hargrave,"' in
which the Court similarly deferred to Florida's state courts, strongly
suggest that when such a provision exists in the applicable state
constitution and prior constructions of that provision have not foreclosed its application in a manner similar to the federal guarantee,"'
abstention will be ordered to permit the state system to determine
the validity of the challenged state statute or regulation under the
3
state constitutional provision."
The consequence of this form of abstention is that the state
court will adjudicate, under the state constitution, the issues initially presented to the federal court for resolution under the federal
constitution."' Abstention of this sort, therefore, is an extension of
111. 401 U.S. 476 (1971). But see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
112. No standards for determining whether prior construction or the clear language of
a state constitutional provision would foreclose a state construction that would avoid the
federal issue have emerged from the decided cases. Indeed, the Court has seemed intentionally to refrain from discussing this question, or even explaining the exact nature of the
independent state constitutional ground on which abstention is based. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 477-78 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1970). See text
accompanying notes 119-23 infra.
113. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970);
P. BATOR, P. MISHKiN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS AND THE FEDERAL
SysTm 992-93 (2d ed. 1973).
114. The Court seemed to withdraw from Reetz in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433 (1971), a case involving a due process challenge to a Wisconsin statute that permitted public posting of the names of persons who disturbed the peace through excessive drinking. In declining to order abstention, the Court stated that "the abstention rule only applies
when 'the issue of state law is uncertain.' "The abstention cases, according to the Court, have
dealt with "unresolved questions of state law which only a state tribunal could authoritatively
construe." 400 U.S. at 438. Reetz was explained as involving a state statute that the state
courts could have construed to avoid the federal question. Id. While this is true, the Court
conveniently omitted the fact that the source of the saving construction in Reetz was a state
constitutional provision that could be interpreted to apply the same standards as the federal
constitution. Likewise, the Wisconsin Constitution contained a due process clause that could
have been employed to "construe" the statute in Constantineau,which was just as clear and
unambiguous as that involved in Reetz. The majority opinion in Constantineaufailed to
satisfy the dissenters, who stated that "Reetz cannot be distinguished.. . ." Id. at 442.
While Constantineauseemed to limit Reetz to its facts, the latter was once again resurrected in Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). In Askew a millage rollback provision of a
recently enacted scheme for partial state financing of public education was attacked by
residents of property-poor districts on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court, on
appeal, reversed the district court's action striking the rollback provision, and abstention was
ordered. As in Reetz and Constantineau,the state statute was clear. There existed, however,
grounds on which the rollback statute might be stricken on state constitutional grounds, and
such claims were being considered in a state court proceeding that was then pending. Characterizing the state constitutional claims as "not the 'same claim,' that is, the federal claim of
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Pullman abstention. "5 Under Pullman, as under Reetz, the state
court is asked to determine an issue of state law that might dispose
of the federal challenge and therefore make resolution of the federal
issue unnecessary. Yet under Pullman the independent state law
ground, whether it arises from common law, statutory law, or the
state constitution, is substantively distinct from the federal issue.
In Pullman, for example, the state court was asked to decide
whether the legislature had delegated sufficient rulemaking power
to the Railroad Commission to justify the challenged regulation.
The federal issue, on the other hand, was whether the regulation as
promulgated violated equal protection and due process standards
embodied in the fourteenth amendment.
To be sure, after abstention in Reetz the state court could construe the State constitutional guarantee in a manner dissimilar to
the federal guarantee. For example, broader rights than those required under federal law could be conferred. A narrower reading
than that permitted under federal law would also be permissible, as
long as the plaintiff was granted the relief requested. The narrower
reading, however, would then be subject to challenge in federal
court by any other proper plaintiff."' In no event would the state
court be free to give the state constitutional provision a reading
inconsistent with the requirements of federal law, for the federal
court would be waiting in the background to enforce the federal
limitations on the construction of the state constitutional provision." 7 Thus it can be seen that the interest in permitting the state
forum to construe state law-an interest which is given great weight
in the Pullman context-is of much less significance in the Reetz
context.
alleged denial of the federal right of equal protection, but primarily state law claims under
the Florida Constitution . . . " id. at 478, the Court held that abstention was proper and
consistent with Reetz. It is difficult to distinguish Askew from Reetz as both involved clear
state statutes that might be invalid under state constitutional provisions. Abstention in both
was grounded on state courts deciding issues of law that were divorced from the challenged
acts, and the inevitable consequence of each was to pressure the state tribunal to "federalize"
the state constitution, thereby taking the heat off the federal system. In light of Askew, Reetz
cannot be considered as strictly limited in scope. The more relevant question indeed may be
whether Constantineauis now limited to its facts. Constantineaumay have been decided
simply because it was an easier case.
115. See note 108 supra.
116. If, for example, the state court in dicta construed the constitutional provision in a
manner inconsistent with federal requirements, a person who might be injured by application
of the construction could challenge it on federal constitutional grounds under the supremacy
clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
117. England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); see Askew v. Hargrave, 401
U.S. 476, 478-79 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970).
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This type of abstention, however, does accomplish two results.
First, it avoids federal court decision of the federal question, and
because the state and federal issues are the same, this can be accomplished very effectively. If the state court acts inconsistent with the
requirements of federal law, the federal court stands ready to correct
the state court's application of "federalized" state constitutional
8
law.,"
A second and equally significant consequence of this fourth
type of abstention is that it allocates the power to adjudicate federal
constitutional questions to the state courts, despite the fact that the
litigation raising those issues was commenced in a federal forum.
The possible use of this doctrine to dramatically alter the forum for
federal constitutional adjudication can be easily foreseen. Many
state constitutions contain due process clauses,"' guarantee rights
of free speech,1 2° and guarantee citizens the equal protection of the
118. If the state constitutional provision was prohibitory in its impact, and its prohibition was inconsistent with federal law, the provisions would be stricken on constitutional
grounds. On the other hand, if the provision granted rights rather than denied them, and the
rights granted were not as broad as the federal constitution required, the state constitutional
provision would not be stricken. Instead, in cases in which the federal guarantee is broader
than that of the state, the federal guarantee would simply supplement the rights conferred
by the state constitution. In the latter instance, abstention under Reetz would not require
the state court to construe its constitutional guarantee as broadly as the federal guarantee,
but significant enticement to do so-at the risk of losing judicial power in the future-would
exist.
119. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1; ALAS. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 4;
ARK. CONST. art. II §§ 2, 8; CAL. CONsT. art. I, §§ 1, 13, 26; COLO. CONST. art. I1 §§ 3, 25;
FLA. CONST. art I, §§ 1, 9; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, cls. 2, 3; HAwAII CONsT. art. I, § 2; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, §§ 1,13; ILL. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2; IND. CONST. art I, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. I,
§§ 1, 9; KAN. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1; Ky. CONST. § 1; LA. CONST. art. , § 2; ME. CONST. art. I, §§
1,6-A; MAss. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 11; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; Miss.
III, § 14; Mo. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2, 10; MONT. CONST. art. 1I, §§ 3,27; NEa. CONST.
art. I, §§ 1, 3; NEv. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8; N.H. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2, 12; N.J. CONST. art. I, §
1; N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.D. CONST.
art. I, §§ 1, 13; OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 7; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 1; S.
C. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 13; VA. CONST.
art. I, §§ 1, 8, 11; VT. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 9, 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; W. VA. CONST. art.
III, §§ 1, 10; WIs. CONST. art. I, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 6.
120. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ALAs. CONST. art. I, § 5; Amiz. CONST. art. II, § 6; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. I, §§
4, 5; DEL, CONST. art. I, § 5; FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 4; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, cI. 15; IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 9; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; KAN. BILL
OF RIGHTS, § 11; Ky. CONsr. § 8; LA. CONsT. art. I, § 3; ME. CONST. art. I, § 4; MD. DECL. OF
RIGHTS, § 40; MASS. CONST. art. I, § 16, amend. LXXVII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 5; MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 3; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 13; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. III, §
10; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.H. CONST. art. I, § 22; N.J. CONST. art.
1, § 6; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 9; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 8; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 7; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5;
CONST. art.
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laws.' 2' The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, 122
however, requires that these state constitutional provisions be applied in a manner consistent with federal requirements,123 and if not
so applied, the state court judgment and enforcement would be
subject to review under applicable federal standards. Thus, virtually any state constitutional provision guaranteeing rights similar
to those protected by the federal constitution would require a state
judicial interpretation consistent with the applicable federal provision. This would provide an independent state ground on which to
base abstention and avoid the federal issue.
Despite the dramatic effect of reallocating power between the
federal and state judicial systems, this result is not without justification. It would be extemely effective as a device for lightening the
workload in the federal system-much of the federal litigation involving challenges to state action on federal constitutional grounds
could be shifted to the state forum. Furthermore, it holds attractive
prospects for increasing the quality of the state court systems. If
substantial quantities of interesting and challenging federal litigation were placed in the state courts, the increased responsibility
might serve to attract better qualified persons to the state court
bench. Ultimately, if quality were significantly improved by this
device, litigants might more often elect to litigate their federal
claims in state courts. In this way, a more equal distribution of
federal litigation between the federal and state courts could be voluntarily achieved.'24
§ 19; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 8; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 15; VT. CONST. art. I,
§ 13; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7; Wis. CONsT.
art. I, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 20.
121. See ALAs. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 3, 7; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. XX,
§ 18; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 4; LA. CONST. art. I, § 4; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 94; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 26; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 3.
122. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
123. See note 118 supra. The federal requirements could be either constitutional or
statutory.
124. Litigation of federal questions in state courts is relatively infrequent today with
at least certain types of jurisdiction. For example, actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970) are rarely maintained in state court. Indeed, some state courts have expressed doubt
concerning their jurisdiction over such cases. E.g., Hirych v. State, 376 Mich. 384, 394, 136
N.W.2d 910, 914 (1965). State courts do, however, possess concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983
claims. The jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983, 28 U.S.C. §1343(3) (1970), grants the federal
courts original but not exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under § 1983. The Civil Rights
Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, contained language that required § 1983 actions "to be
prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States," but this language
was deleted in the 1873-74 codification. Rev. Stat. §§ 563(12), 629(16) (2d ed. 1873-74). It
would be difficult to treat this deletion as an elimination of "surplusage." See Jones v. Alfred
TENN. CONST. art. I,
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It seems evident that, at the very least, frequent resort to the
Reetz doctrine could result in significant alteration of the federal
courts' role in adjudicating constitutional challenges to state statutes, regulations, or official acts. By calling for abstention in cases
such as Reetz and Askew, the Supreme Court has held, albeit selectively, that while a suitor's choice of a federal forum for vindication
of federal rights should be recognized and protected,' 5 there is nothing in the Constitution or any act of Congress that expressly requires
that forum.'25 Indeed, this form of abstention would make the constitutional principle of concurrent jurisdiction over most federal is27
sues a reality.
IV.

A PROPOSED ABSTENTION MODEL

Identification of these four varieties of abstention is helpful in
constructing a descriptive model of the currently applied abstention
rules and in predicting the circumstances in which a federal court
is likely to refrain from immediate decision. The policies served by
abstention and the concomitant justifications for abstention in any
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 n.29 (1968). Inasmuch as § 1343(3) does not provide for
exclusive jurisdiction over § 1983 actions in the federal courts, the state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction under § 1343(3). See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876). See
generally U.S. CONST. art. VI.

125. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967); see Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
126. The Supreme Court has often announced the principle that a federal court has "no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). Yet the principle's application is not so rigid as this statement suggests. In Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939),
for example, the Court discussed its obligation to accept jurisdiction in light of the Cohens
opinion.
We have observed that the broad statement that a court having jurisdiction must
exercise it . . . is not universally true but has been qualified in certain cases where the
federal courts may, in their discretion, properly withhold the exercise of the jurisdiction
conferred upon them where there is no want of another suitable forum. . . . Grounds
for justifying such a qualification have been found in "considerations of convenience,
efficiency and justice" applicable to particular classes of cases.
308 U.S. at 19. Meredithv. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,236 (1943); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 288 U.S. 123, 131 (1933); Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, 285 U.S. 413, 42223 (1932); see Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187
F.2d 14 (2d. Cir. 1951). For an interesting analysis of this question in the context of diversity
jurisdiction see Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the DiversityJurisdictionof Federal
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1956).
127. Unless jurisidiction is granted exclusively to the federal courts by statute, the state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over most cases arising under the
constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502 (1962); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884); Chaflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.
130, 136 (1876); U.S. CONST. art. VI; P. BATOR, D. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM,

428-34 (2d ed. 1973).
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given case, however, remain to be considered. The following pages
will be devoted, first, to identifying and evaluating those policies,
and secondly, to constructing a set of principles that should govern
the application of the abstention device.
A.

The Principles UnderlyingAbstention

Two justifications are most often cited for application of the
abstention doctrine:'2 the avoidance of a constitutional decision
and the conflict that might be engendered between the federal and
state systems by federal decision of local law issues. Analysis of the
decisions, however, establishes that these policies are neither consistently employed nor always fulfilled. Were avoidance of constitutional questions the only justification for abstention, for example, a
persuasive argument could be made that only Pullman-type abstention would be proper. In general, the other forms of abstention do
not result in avoidance of the federal question but in its postponement or decision in another forum.'19 If, on the other hand, avoidance of friction between federal and state systems is the paramount
justification for abstention, one might well conclude that only
Burford-type abstention would be wholly justified.'30 It is only under
Burford, when abstention occasions dismissal of the federal action,
that complete confidence in the state judicial system is manifested.
The consequence is that neither justification for abstention satisfactorily explains the decisions invoking it. Moreover, the justifications themselves may be challenged as unduly vague and inherently unpredictable in their application. But a "bright-line" policy
of inflexible rules is not necessary and such a policy may not be
desirable,' 3 ' given the various contexts in which abstention arises
128. See, e.g., Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FED RAL CouRTs § 52, at 196-208 (2d
ed. 1970); Kurland, Toward a Co-operative JudicialFederalism:The Federal CourtAbstention Doctrine,24F.R.D. 481 (1959); Wright, The Abstention DoctrineReconsidered,37TExAs
L. REv. 815 (1959); Note, Federal-QuestionAbstention: JusticeFrankfurter'sDoctrine in an
Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REv. 604 (1967).
129. See text accompanying notes 52-63 (abstention in order to permit a modification
of the federal question), 64-102 (abstention to avoid interference with state functions), and
103-27 (abstention in light of state constitutional provisions), supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 21-51 (abstention in light of dispositive state law
issues), 52-63 (modiciation of the federal issue), and 103-27 (state constitutional provisions),
supra.
131. Compare Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs L. REv. 815,
825-26 (1959), with H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 94-96 (1973). The
American Law Institute has proposed a codification of the abstention doctrine. AmsmcAN LAW
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and the sensitivity required in applying the relevant standards. A
certain degree of predictability and systemization, however, does
emerge from an analysis of the decisions, suggesting two further
principles that contribute to the abstention decision. Both stem
from a single proposition: in many instances a federal court, notwithstanding its jurisdiction, is less qualified to adjudicate a controversy than the state court.
First, when the federal court fears that in the course of adjudication a significant and damaging misinterpretation of state law
will occur, with consequent harm to the state or local government,
it will first ask the state forum to announce its binding judgment
as to the meaning and application of local law. It is not essential
for this principle's application that such a pronouncement dispose
of the need for subsequent federal action, but if it does, that is an
added factor favoring abstention. The important factor, however, is
that the state pronouncement will "educate" subsequent federal
review of issues appropriately in that forum and consequently increase the quality of the federal decision.
Secondly, when the federal court is faced with issues-federal,
state, or both-for which the state forum has more competence or
skill to adjudicate, the federal court will relinquish its original jurisdiction in favor of the local forum. This action is based on an assessment of the respective strengths and weaknesses of the federal and
state courts. If the federal court is less capable of adjudicating the
issues, developing the facts, and applying law to fact, there is no
justification-all other things being equal-for employing the federal forum for resolution of the controversy. To do so would be
consciously to select the forum least likely to reach a proper and just
result.
These two principles are markedly distinct in their results, even
though they are based on an identical underlying policy designed to
assure the highest quality adjudication. The first principleabstention in order to educate later federal adjudication-relates
to the timing of federal review. The second principle-abstention
in order to permit the state forum to adjudicate issues clearly
within the federal court's jurisdiction and traditional domainrelates to the place for or location of judicial review. Both, however,
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISON OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1371

and commentary, at 282-90 (1969). The ALl formulation would permit abstention in cases
involving only state law issues when the state law is unsettled or when federal court decision
of state law would embarrass the effectuation of state policies if in error. § 1371(c). When
abstention is appropriate under the ALl model, the Englandrule would not apply. § 1371(d).
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are allocative devices designed to insure the highest quality review
and the preservation of respect for the institution of judicial
review.
These principles, however, do not serve to justify abstention
under Reetz v. Bozanich 2 and Askew v. Hargrave.33' It is difficult
to conclude that the state courts in these cases would contribute
meaningfully to the federal judgment, despite-the fact that Reetz
involved Alaska's admittedly substantial interest in preserving
wildlife, an abundant and important natural resource in that state,
and Askew involved Florida's Substantial interest in its allocation
of resources to education. The issues presented were new, difficult,
and of the sort that the federal courts are most capable of deciding.
Reetz and Askew, accordingly, may be read to represent a very
different principle: state courts should adjudicate the constitutionality of state statutes. Thus Reetz and Askew clearly seem to represent a marked extension of the Pullman doctrine, in which abstention is based upon potentially dispositive state law grounds. The
extension stems from the identity of the state and federal issues and
the vast reallocative effect that results when this identity is recognized. The potential for application of this extended Pullman rationale is almost limitless when the rationale is applied in the absence of considerations bearing on the competence of the state
forum.134
132. 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
133. 401 U.S. 476 (1971). For a discussion of Reetz and Askew see text accompanying
notes 103-27 supra. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
134. Reetz, Constantineau,and Askew can also be interpreted as cases involving abstention based solely on the presence of a potentially dispositive state law ground that would
permit avoidance of the federal question. However they are viewed, it is submitted that they
represent a marked extension of the abstention doctrine and an extension that should not be
continued. This conclusion is based on two premises. First, Reetz strongly suggests that the
Supreme Court is assuming the power to reallocate adjudicatory responsibility over federal
questions to the state systems on the basis of nothing more than the increasing federal
workload and diminishing participation of state courts in the adjudication of federal matters
over which they have concurrent jurisdiction. This sort of judgment, unaccompanied by
further circumstances that would suggest that the state forum is superior to the federal forum
for adjudication of the particular issue presented, should be made by the Congress rather than
the judicial branch. Significant personal rights are at stake, as well as the litigant's right to
free choice of forum in the absence of compelling circumstances that justify departure from
that rule. And the potentially broad application of the Reetz rule suggests that the balance
of rights and interests, as well as the potentially revolutionary alteration of the scope of
original federal jurisdiction, counsel in favor of consideration by Congress. Secondly, Reetz
abstention, even when viewed as simply a special application of Pullman abstention, manifests the inherent difficulties involved in limiting the principle that a federal court should
abstain if possibly dispositive state law grounds exist. These difficulties, in turn, counsel
against exclusive reliance on dispositive state law grounds as a general basis for the abstention
technique.
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An assessment of the competence of the state forum to adjudicate the controversy or contribute to its adjudication in a significant
way would provide an alternative approach that would avoid the
problems of application manifested by the Reetz case. Under this
alternative formulation, Wisconsin v. Constantineau'3 -in which
the Supreme Court declined to order abstention-would not be irreconcilable with Reetz and Askew. Constantineau involved a due
process challenge to a Wisconsin statute that permitted public posting of names of persons who disturbed the peace through excessive
drinking. In that case there was little, if anything, that the state
courts could have contributed to the federal adjudication.13 It seems
clear that in Constantineau the federal court was best suited to
adjudicate the controversy in light of the type of issue presented, the
presence of a full and adequate record, the experience that the federal forum possessed by virtue of its familiarity with the issues
presented, and the speedier adjudication that would result in the
previously filed federal action. 3 '
Lastly, the presence of possibly dispositive state law grounds or
the avoidance of friction between the federal and state courts are
inadequate grounds for the invocation of abstention because these
grounds are at once too broad and too narrow in application. This
approach, moreover, would require a reading and interpretation of
state law that the federal court may not be capable of undertaking.
In its extreme applications this approach breeds inconsistency that
can be explained only in light of the Court's largely unarticulated
judgments concerning the difficulty of the issues presented or its
desire to postpone resolution of the issue until a later case. If an
issue is properly presented and falls within a federal court's jurisdiction, it should be resolved on the merits. The only questions properly addressed through the abstention doctrine should be where
and when the case would be best decided.
135. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
136. See note 114 supra.
137. It should be noted that while this formulation of the abstention rule serves to
explain Constantineau,the Reetz and Askew decisions might be inconsistent with or wrongly
decided under the formulation. Reconciliation of the 3 cases under this formulation is not
foreclosed or impossible, however, since the Court's brief opinions in Reetz and Askew are
sufficiently ambiguous to permit the conclusion that abstention was ordered in Askew in light
of distinct state law grounds and in Reetz in order to permit the state court to modify the
federal issue and consequently "educate" later federal adjudication. These alternative interpretations, however, are strained.
Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974), can be read to represent a movement toward
this application of the Reetz abstention model.
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B. The General Model
A general model for abstention can now be identified. The
model consists of a three-pronged test, each prong representing a
distinct variety of abstention. Each prong, likewise, is based on
somewhat different policies and results in different consequences.
First, if there exists a distinct state law issue, the resolution of
which will require the application of legal standards different from
those embodied in an underlying federal issue, and if there is a clear
basis for predicting that the state law issue might dispose of the
case, abstention will be justified. 138 The policy underlying this variety of abstention is the avoidance of unnecessary federal adjudication. This type of abstention should not be employed unless the
state court is more capable of resolving the state law issue than the
federal court.'39 Furthermore, if the state court would also be as
capable of resolving the federal issue as the federal court, the court
should dismiss the action rather than retain jurisdiction. 4 ' Finally,
in employing this form of abstention, the federal court should be
mindful of both the delay that will likely result from abstention and
the federal-state friction that may be caused by the prospect of
federal re-entry under the England rule. As a consequence, this form
of abstention should be employed only where the state law issue is
likely to be dispositive and when employed, a presumption of dismissal by the federal court should apply.
138. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), would remain the principal
case under this heading.
139. For example, in Reetz the Court was applying a variation of Pullman abstention
because of the possible dispositiveness of the state court's interpretation of the state constitutional provision. It is very likely, however, that the federal court would have been as capable
of construing the meaning of the state provision in light of that provision's similarity to the
applicable federal guarantee, the federal court's experience with the particular issues raised
in the case, and the lack of evidence-from the Court's opinion-that important state policies
and interests were significantly implicated.
Another example might be Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S.Ct. 1800 (1974), discussed in text
accompanying note 161-65 infra. In Procuniera vagueness challenge to certain regulations
limiting prisoners' correspondence rights was instituted. Notwithstanding the possibility of
a state court construction of the regulations that could avoid the federal question in the case,
abstention was not ordered. The federal court could assess the facial constitutionality of the
allegedly vague regulations, thus making the state court construction unnecessary.
140. When dismissal results, abstention produces the greatest functional benefits.
Delay is avoided, tension from the threat of federal re-entry is diminished, federal workload
at the district and appellate level is decreased, and state court participation and responsibility is at its greatest level. As developed earlier, however, dismissal should occur only when
the federal court believes that the state forum is capable of adjudicating the entire controversy at least as reliably, efficiently, and fairly as the federal court. See text accompanying
notes 64-102 supra.
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The second prong of the abstention model applies when the
federal court believes that state court resolution of underlying state
law issues will predictably contribute in a significant way to later
federal adjudication, despite the absence of a fully dispositive state
law ground.'4 ' Here federal re-entry after abstention is inevitable,
yet the state forum is employed as a "partner" in the federal
decision-making process in order to "educate" later federal adjudication of the federal issues. While this variety of abstention can lead
to significant friction between the federal and state courts, its application in narrowly confined circumstances can be justified in that
it avoids erroneous or insensitive resolution of an issue that is properly in the federal court. An example of this variety of abstention
would be preemption litigation in which the issue is not whether a
federal statute has preempted state law, but the extent and nature
42
of the preemption.
The third prong of the proposed abstention model applies when
the federal court concludes that a more reliable adjudication of the
federal issues could be achieved in the state forum.' The existence
of a potentially dispositive state law issue is not relevant here. When
the state court is considered the more reliable forum, dismissal by
the federal court should result, and original jurisdiction over the
controversy should be shifted to the state forum. The policy underlying this form of abstention is not the avoidance of friction between
the federal and state systems. Rather, the policy is the allocation
of federal judicial power to the forum best suited to full and fair
resolution of the issues. While this form of abstention is least likely
to cause friction between the federal and state courts, it is potentially most prejudicial to the rights of the parties, for original jurisdiction over the case is shifted to the state forum with no prospect
of later review in the federal district court. While there is no absolute right to selection of forum, the federal plaintiff's choice of forum
should be respected unless compelling circumstances justify departure from that norm.
141. E.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
142. Other examples, however, can be easily imagined. When a detailed, comprehensive
state regulatory system is challenged in whole or in part, abstention to permit the state forum
to construe the provisions, identify severable portions thereof, or articulate underlying policies or practical applications might be in order despite the inevitability of federal re-entry
under England. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974); Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). Of course, when important rights are at
stake, the need for prompt adjudication may pretermit abstention that would otherwise be
justified. See text accompanying notes 187-91 infra.
143. E.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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The basic purpose underlying all three prongs of this abstention
model is the allocation of judicial power in each case to the forum
that is most competent to resolve the issues presented. This involves, ultimately, an assessment of the relative abilities of the state
and federal systems to adjudicate the issues, whether that adjudication involves resolution of a potentially dispositive state law issue,
resolution of nondispositive state law issues that will bear on the
federal questions and increase the reliability of later federal judgments, or resolution of the federal issues in the state forum. This
perspective identifies the overriding thrust of abstention. While relevant, considerations relating solely to avoiding unnecessary decision of federal issues or mitigating friction between the federal and
state systems are clearly of secondary importance in the abstention
context. This is in marked contrast to the comity doctrine, in which
avoidance of friction assumes paramount importance and matters
of competence and expertise are distinctly secondary."'
V.

FACTORS BEARING ON ABSTENTION

Variables relevant to the abstention decision have been developed above.145 They are generally subsumed under the heading of
efficient and expert adjudication. Further considerations can be
identified, however, and used to determine those situations in which
a federal court should abstain.4
A.

Abstention Versus Certification

The availability of certification, a procedure that would permit
the federal court to certify unsettled questions of state law to the
state supreme court, is of substantial utility in the Pullman abstention context. 4 7 Under such a process the highest state court would
render a definitive construction of uninterpreted or unclear state
144. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971). See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 206 (2d ed. 1970);
Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of
Dombrowski, 48 TExAs L. REV. 535, 541 (1970).
145. See text accompanying notes 138-44 supra.
146. The application of these factors assumes that the federal court has concluded, as
an initial matter, that the state forum is at least as experienced as the federal court in
adjudicating the relevant issues and that the presence of other related factors, such as important state governmental interests or programs, counsels in favor of the state court as the best
adjudicating body.
147. Certification procedures are now available in many states. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.72.1 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 26, § 161 (Supp. 1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 490 App. R. 20 (Supp. 1973), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.60.010 - .030 (Supp. 1973); COLO.
App. R. 21.1 (1970); MASS. Sup. JuD. CT. R. 3:21 (1973); MONT. SuP. CT. R. 1 (1973).
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statutes or clarify other unsettled questions of state law.'
The United States Supreme Court has employed this device in
the past,"' as have numerous lower federal courts.'50 Recently the
Court reaffirmed the availability and utility of the certification device in Lehman Brothers v. Schein,'5 ' a diversity action brought in
federal court alleging misuse of corporate property through insider
trading in securities. The federal court was forced to determine the
scope of fiduciary obligations imposed under Florida law. The trial
court proceeded to interpret and apply Florida law,'52 but the court
of appeals reversed, interpreting Florida law differently.'53 The
United States Supreme Court reversed and ordered resort to the
Florida certification procedure despite the fact that the lawsuit had
consumed more than two years of trial and appellate litigation.'54
Certification was considered "particularly appropriate in view of the
novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida law,
Florida being a distant State [from the New York District Court in
which the case was tried]."' 55 In such a situation, federal judges
attempting to interpret state law "act. . . as 'outsiders' lacking the
common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction.""'
The Court further intimated that if certification had not been
available in Lehman Brothers the federal court would have been
well advised to stay its hand by applying Pullman abstention and
allowing the Florida courts to adjudicate the controversy.' 7 The
certification procedure, however, was considered more appropriate,
as it "save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism."' 5 8
148. For a discussion of the certification process and its objectives see Vestal, The
Certified Question of Law, 36 IowA L. REv. 629 (1951).
149. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963); Aldrich v.
Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963).
150. The Fifth Circuit has been most active in employing the device. E.g., Trial Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 430 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1970); Gaston v. Pittman, 413 F.2d 1031 (5th
Cir. 1969); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968).
151. 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974).
152. Id. at 1743.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1745. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 1744.
156. Id. This language suggests that the Court would not have ordered resort to the
certification procedure had the federal court been located in Florida rather than New York.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Without question, a certification procedure is more efficient
than abstention for determining the meaning of state law and ascertaining the policies underlying the relevant state law issues present
in the litigation. The benefits of certification, however, are limited.
When questions of law and general policy or legislative purpose are
present in a controversy, little more than a definitive ruling on the
questions of law is necessary, and the certification process is adequate.
On the other hand, abstention is more appropriate in the many
cases in which it is necessary to take advantage of the state court's
fact-finding experience. This is ordinarily the case in the Burford
context, in which abstention is based largely on a determination
that the state forum would be a more efficient and reliable forum
for the complete adjudication of all federal and state issues presented in the controversy. Because abstention allows a full and reliable determination of fact-laden issues and policy by the betterqualified state court,'59 it also serves as the better vehicle for abdication to the state courts when state law grounds might be dispositive
or when significant modification of the federal questions presented
in the litigation might result. 6 ' Therefore, while the certification
device is a valuable tool for the abstaining court, its utility must be
measured against the purposes underlying abstention. In the
Pullman context certification will ordinarily be appropriate; in
other abstention contexts its usefulness is less evident.
B.

Vagueness Challenges

Vagueness challenges to state statutes or rules present a federal
question that demands special attention,16 ' because in almost all
such cases an argument can easily be constructed under Pullman
that abstention is necessary due to possibly dispositive state law
grounds that would avoid or at least substantially modify the federal question. The Supreme Court addressed the dilemma posed by
vagueness challenges in Baggett v. Bullitt"2 and again recently in
Procunier v. Martinez."3 In Procunierthe Court stated the stan159. E.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMuan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
160. See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
161. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974); Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
162. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
163. Procunier v. Martinez, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974), discussed in text accompanying notes
188-91 infra.
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dards governing abstention in vagueness cases as follows:
For the purpose of applying the doctrine of abstention the Court [in
Baggett] distinguished between two kinds of vagueness attacks. Where the
case turns on the applicability of a state statute or regulation to a particular
person or a defined course of conduct, resolution of the unsettled question of
state law may eliminate any need for constitutional adjudication. ... Abstention is therefore appropriate. Where, however, as in this case, the statute or
regulation is challenged as vague because individuals to whom it plainly applies simply cannot understand what is required of them and do not wish to
foreswear all activity arguably within the scope of the vague terms, abstention
is not required. .. . In such a case no single adjudication by a state court could
eliminate the constitutional difficulty.'"

The distinction drawn by the Court appears to be between
vagueness in the scope of the statute (overbreadth) and vagueness
in the meaning of the proscriptive terms employed. In the former
instance a state court in a single adjudication may be capable of
limiting the scope of the statute. In the latter instance, however, the
applicability of vague terms to courses of conduct must be determined on a case-by-case basis in the state court, and the state
court's role in the abstention context would therefore consist primarily of clarification and construction of the statutory language
rather than adjudication of the constitutional issue. Thus, a single
state court proceeding would not adequately ameliorate the inhibiting effect of the vague terms on future conduct arguably within the
statutory language.1 5 In short, at least in cases involving first
amendment overtones, the federal court would assess the facial constitutionality of the state statute or regulation when the proscriptive
language is vague.
While this distinction is discernible and meaningful in the limited context of Pullman, in which possibly dispositive state law
grounds serve as the basis for abstention, its applicability in other
abstention contexts is not as clear. Under Burford the federal court
will dismiss the case in favor of the more efficient, competent, and
reliable state forum. Whether in this context the federal question in
164. 94 S. Ct. at 1805-06 n.5. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 481-92 (1965);
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 376-78 (1964). Cf. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968),
in which a 3-judge court's refusal to issue a declaratory judgment or injunction against a
Mississippi anti-picketing law was affirmed on the ground that the challenged statute was
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
165. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-92 (1965). But see Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241 (1967), in which the Court refused to order abstention because the relevant
statute was attacked as overbroad, with a consequent deterrent effect upon first amendment
rights. Zwickler suggests that overbreadth in the first amendment context so inhibits the
exercise of first amendment freedoms that abstention is improper, notwithstanding the contrary implications of Baggett. But Cameron and Procunierseem to undercut this reasoning.
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the case involves overbreadth or facial unconstitutionality seems an
irrelevant inquiry if the federal court is convinced that the state
forum could more reliably and efficiently adjudicate the matter.
This determination, in turn, will be governed in large part by considerations that will be discussed next relating to the difficulty and
importance of the federal question presented in the case.
C.

The Nature of the FederalIssue

The nature of the issues presented in a case should be considered before a federal court abstains. The impact of this consideration on the abstention decision can be assessed from two perspectives: the difficulty and sensitivity of the federal issue presented and
the competence and reliability of the state forum.
1. The Difficulty and Sensitivity of the Issue
The fact that the difficulty and sensitivity of the federal issue
is a factor to be considered in determining whether to invoke abstention should not be taken to mean that abstention will only be used
in a narrow category of cases. As has been noted, abstention has
been ordered in a broad variety of cases.' 6 This is particularly true
in the Pullman abstention context, in which possibly dispositive
state law grounds serve as the primary basis for withholding decision in the federal court. Pullman abstention not only has been
invoked in cases involving economic and business regulation, ' but
also in litigation involving race discrimination,' 8 first amendment
rights,'6 9 and other guarantees that are today considered "fundamental. 170 Nor can one conclude that the cases arising in these
sensitive areas of personal liberties did not present claims with substantial merit.' 7 ' Abstention under Lake Carriers' Association v.
166. See notes 41 & 96 supra.
167. See, e.g., Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358
U.S. 639 (1959).
168. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
169. See, e.g., Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S.
364 (1957); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
170. See, e.g., Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S.
167 (1959).
171. Compare Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), with NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963).
One conclusion which might be drawn from this observation is that Pullmanabstention
is generously employed as an avoidance device. The same observations and conclusions may
be drawn from Reetz, Constantineau,and Askew. Constantineauwas by far the easiest of the
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MacMullan,7 2 to permit modification of the federal issue, has been
so infrequently applied in its pure form that little analysis of its
application can be undertaken. One might surmise, however, that
due to its similarity and frequent coexistence with Pullman abstention, 73 the Lake Carriers'rule would be applied in a similar manner.
Abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Company174 involves dismissal
of the action in the federal court, and one might suspect from this
that the inclination to avoid difficult decisions would be diminished. To some extent this appears to be the case, although the cases
do not establish a clear pattern, for Burford-type abstention has
been ordered when relatively important constitutional guarantees
were involved. 75
Many of these holdings provide support for Professor Wright's
observation that instead of the aforementioned perspective of the
difficulty and sensitivity of the federal issue being the basis for
abstention, the doctrine is sometimes employed as a device to serve
the convenience of federal courts and to avoid the decision of hard
questions. '71 While Professor Wright's point was limited to only a
few cases,171 the observation seems plausible for all forms of abstention, and the use of abstention to achieve these ends is inconsistent
with the federal court's obligation to decide cases properly before it
or to refuse decision on principled and articulated grounds. 78 More
importantly, however, those cases in which one most suspects that
abstention was grounded on this foundation contain little, if any,
evaluation of the sensitivity of the state court to the federal rights
asserted or the need for prompt adjudication of the federal right. 179
Absent other factors justifying abstention, the mere difficulty
three cases to decide, and accordingly, perhaps, abstention was not ordered. The Court in
Constantineaudevoted only 2 brief paragraphs to the relatively simple procedural due process
point, 400 U.S. at 436-37, with no Justice expressing disagreement with the merits of the due
process issue.
172. 406 U.S. 498 (1972).
173. See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
174. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
175. See, e.g., Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965); Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok

Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
176. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52 at 203 n.51, 205 (2d
ed. 1970).
177. See, e.g., United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951);
Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949).
178. See authorities cited note 102 supra.
179. See, e.g., Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82
(1970); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Government & Civic Employees Organizing
Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
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of the questions presented to the federal court should not permit the
federal court to avoid decision. The federal and state courts are in
the business of deciding difficult and close questions; indeed, it is
the easier questions or the frivolous cases that should most appropriately be removed from the docket. Those cases that present the
most difficult questions often involve sensitive issues of personal
liberty. It is in this general area that the state systems may exhibit
the least reliability and sensitivity.
2.

The Sensitivity and Competence of the State Courts

While the sensitivity and competence of state courts to adjudicate matters involving important constitutional guarantees has,
with few exceptions, 8 0 occasioned little discussion in the Court's
opinions, this should not be taken as conclusive evidence that such
matters are not considered. An evaluation of the relevant state court
system, or the particular state judges involved, would be unseemly
and divisive if made explicit. It is altogether possible, however, that,
particularly on the district court level, such considerations play a
significant although unarticulated role in the abstention decision.
The sensitivity and competence of the state courts have been
assessed in a less direct fashion. In a number of cases the Court has
evaluated the importance of the right asserted in the litigation 1 '
and the need for prompt adjudication to avoid further and continued abridgment of the pertinent constitutional guarantee. 812 Such
considerations have had a particularly strong influence in first
amendment cases, in which prompt judgment may be required to
remedy the consequences of a vague or an overbroad statute.'1 In
other contexts the Court has also accorded such matters substantial
weight, 18 4 yet no standard has been articulated or consistently applied.
Explicit evaluation of the competence and reliability of the
state courts has been avoided in the past largely through selective
invocation of the mottos that the federal courts are the preferred
180. See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180, 182, 184 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
181. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360, 375-80 (1964); cf. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
182. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964).
183. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964).
184. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Harman v. Forssenius,
380 U.S. 528 (1965); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). Cf. McNeese v. Board
of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674-76 (1963).
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forum for adjudication of federal rights 8" and that they have an
obligation to respect the suitor's choice of forum if proper jurisdiction exists. 86 Federal courts have been and most likely will continue
to be the most frequently employed forum for the adjudication of
federal issues, and a suitor's choice of forum should presumptively
be respected. But the issue squarely presented through the abstention doctrine is whether these rules ought to be inflexibly applied
notwithstanding important countervailing considerations. Since
1941 the latter inquiry has been answered in the negative through
consistent application of the abstention principle. When the competence of the state court to adjudicate sensitive federal issues is a
relevant consideration, the question becomes one of how to assess
that competence without demeaning the state forum while employing at least a modicum of explicit, principled, and predictable analysis.
Three factors should be assessed by the abstaining court in its
effort to determine the reliability and relative competence of the
state forum when adjudication of sensitive federal rights is required.
These factors are the extent to which the state judges are independent of the political or electoral process, the availability and adequacy of effective remedies in the state courts, and the procedures
and fact-finding capacity of the state courts. These purely objective
criteria should be employed not to determine the subjective competence of the state courts, but to assess the reliability and adequacy
of the state forum for adjudication of important federal rights. It is
important to note, furthermore, that these criteria relate to matters
beyond the control of the state courts. They do not require an assessment of past state court decisions, the personalities of state court
judges, or the prevailing judicial philosophy of the state supreme
court. Rather, they relate to characteristics of the state judicial
process that are governed by external legislative or executive forces.
These factors will not be wholly relevant in every context. The
weight that is accorded them should be determined in light of their
relevance to the basic abstention inquiry: is the state form an efficient and reliable alternative to the federal court in this particular
case? For example, in a case involving sensitive and potentially
controversial issues, the independence of the state judiciary would
assume great significance. In a case requiring immediate attention
to avoid continuing and irreparable damage to affected parties, the
availability of prompt relief in the state forum should be of para185.
186.

See authorities cited in note 180 supra.
See authorities cited note 102 supra.
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mount importance. Likewise, cases involving issues that must be
resolved on the basis of extensive discovery, in which impeachment
of witnesses or admissibility of certain forms of evidence is crucial,
should trigger inquiry into state and federal rules of discovery or
evidence.
D.

Making the Abstention Decision

The state court's competence and reliability in fairly and fully
adjudicating matters involving important constitutional guarantees
should be the relevant index for the abstention decision. In general,
the evaluation of the state courts in this respect has two dimensions.
The first dimension is an assessment of the ability of the state court
itself, based on prior experience and other considerations, to reliably
and impartially adjudicate the issues.
Apart from an inquiry into the competence of the state forum,
a second dimension in which the difficulty of the federal issue can
be assessed is the need for prompt relief regardless of the respective
competences of the state and federal systems. For example, when
important rights are asserted requiring immediate vindication, the
federal court should proceed to judgment unless compelling circumstances dictate otherwise.
The importance of the right asserted or the need for immediate
judicial relief, however, should not pretermit abstention in all cases.
When warranted in light of all other considerations, abstention
should be the general rule. An exception to that rule should be based
on a careful assessment of the claim asserted, the particular context
in which it arises in the litigation, and the particular plaintiff raising the issue. Furthermore, the need for immediate relief need not
always preempt the abstention result, because the federal court
could issue temporary relief prior to abstention and submit the issue
to the state forum for decision in the calmer atmosphere of the
status quo ante.
The posture of the federal court after abstention is ordered also
should be considered when assessing the respective roles of the state
and federal courts in adjudication of difficult or important federal
issues. If the federal court will dismiss the case, thereby shifting
original jurisdiction to the state forum, greater consideration should
be given the nature of the issue presented and the competence of
the state forum to resolve it.' s7 When, on the other hand, federal
187. This may account for the infrequent application of Burford abstention to cases
involving "fundamental" constitutional guarantees. See notes 96 & 175 supra.
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jurisdiction is retained under either Pullman or Lake Carriers',considerations relating to the competence and sensitivity of the state
court diminish in importance and the need for immediate relief
through prompt judicial review assumes predominant significance.
Thus, two cases of equal merit involving the same substantive issue
might be decided differently if one requires prompt judicial attention.
Finally, underlying all abstention decisions is the notion that
the state and federal courts are engaged in a co-operative judicial
enterprise of guaranteeing and enforcing the federal constitution,
laws, and treaties. The need to preserve state judicial presence is
ultimately essential to the preservation of those guarantees, particularly in light of the increasing burden of litigation that is being
placed on the federal system.
The application of these considerations can be illustrated by
the recent Supreme Court decision of Procunierv. Martinez.' The
case involved a first amendment challenge to California prison regulations restricting prisoners' mail privileges. In declining to order
abstention despite the presence of issues that would justify such a
result-such as unclear and uninterpreted regulations that might be
8 9 and past experience
construed to avoid the federal question"
by the
California courts in adjudicating similar issues touching on important state interests and correctional policy' 9 -the Court emphasized "the high cost of abstention when the federal constitutional
9
challenge concerns facial repugnance to the First Amendment."' '
In this case, where important first amendment rights were at stake
and prompt attention was required to avoid further loss of those
rights under a continuing regulatory program, the interest in permitting the experienced federal forum to resolve the issues immediately outweighed the interest in promoting state court participation
in federal constitutional adjudication. This result would occur
under the proposed balancing approach notwithstanding the presence of a reliable state forum to fully and fairly adjudicate the
controversy.
In short, the application of these factors on a case-by-case basis
must be grounded on a realistic and sensitive evaluation of the
188. 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974).
189. Id. at 1806.
190. Id.; cf. In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 500 P.2d 873, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1972). In
Jordanthe California Supreme Court invalidated prison rules that had forbidden confidential
attorney-client correspondence. A challenge to these rules was raised in the district court in
Procunier,but the court stayed its hand pending resolution of the Jordan case.
191. 94 S. Ct. at 1807.
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respective judicial systems and the requirements for resolution of
each particular case. Inflexible standards that are applicable to all
cases in all contexts cannot be articulated without significantly restricting the discretion of the district court and limiting the sensitivity of abstention as a device for achieving an efficient, fair, and
functional allocation of judicial power and jurisdiction between the
federal and state systems.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The effect of abstention is a reallocation of judicial power. It is,
by definition, a surrender of jurisdiction by the federal court as well
as a declination by that court of its substantive power to interpret
and apply the Constitution and laws of the United States. Abstention is not, however, a doctrine through which the judicial system
disavows the power to adjudicate certain classes of issues. Nor is it
a doctrine through which the judicial branch declines to decide the
merits of a particular case presented to it. The political question
doctrine'92 and the doctrines of standing,'9 3 ripeness,'94 and mootness ' 5 serve these functions.
Abstention presupposes the jurisdictional power and capacity
of the judicial system to resolve a controversy. Through the vehicle
of abstention the federal court considers whether the federal or state
system is most capable of adjudicating the matter before it. Thus,
abstention cannot be viewed or evaluated in the same terms as the
political question and standing doctrines. It must be viewed in
terms of the most appropriate allocation of subject matter jurisdiction and judicial power between the federal and state systems.
When considered from this perspective, three conclusions
emerge regarding the abstention doctrine. First, abstention should
not be based simply on elimination of friction between the federal
and state systems, or on the avoidance of decision by the federal
forum. While avoidance of friction and regard for the independence
of state governments are laudatory goals that will hopefully be
served by abstention, these goals are too broad and undefined to be
192. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Scharpf, JudicialReview and the Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE
L.J. 517 (1966).
193. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968).
194. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
195. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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of significant assistance in the doctrine's application. Abstention
will serve these same ends when based on a careful appraisal of the
experience, efficiency, and reliability of the state and federal courts
as well as the needs and interests of the particular litigants at bar.
So applied, the doctrine will possess a functional utility that some
current applications belie.'
The second conclusion drawn from this study is that abstention
should not be based on inflexible criteria that limit the discretion
of the abstaining court. No general class of cases can be meaningfully excised from the doctrine's reach; no general set of circumstances can be identified that will always trigger the doctrine's application. Rather, abstention is an equitable doctrine in which sound
judicial discretion is applied in each particular case.
Finally, abstention is a doctrine based on sound principles of
federalism and joint participation of state and federal courts in
federal litigation. An approach based on this principled footing,
which seeks the most efficient and reliable forum for adjudication
of federal interests, is the highest form of "cooperative judicial federalism."' 97 Based as it is on a sensitive appraisal of the function and
capacities of both state and federal systems, abstention will result
in the meaningful participation of the state courts in the federal
adjudicative process, an end that is consistent with the concurrent
jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Constitution.
196. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397
U.S. 82 (1970).
197. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741, 1744 (1974); see Kurland, Toward a
Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481
(1960).

